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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES:
Amendment 5.
No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise
infamous crime , unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in
the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger; ,nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.
Amendment 6.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.

Constitution of the United States (continued):
Amendment 14, Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny 'to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of laws.

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH:
Article VIII, Section 4.
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and
evidence to be used in the courts of the state and shall by rule
manage the appellate process. The Legislature may amend the Rules
of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a
vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the
Legislature. Except as otherwise provided by this constitution,
the Supreme Court by rule may authorize retired justices and
judges pro tempore to perform any judicial duties. Judges pro
tempore shall be citizens of the United States, Utah residents,
and admitted to practice law in Utah. The Supreme Court by rule

Constitution of Utah
Article VIII, Section 4 (continued):
shall govern the practice of law and the conduct and discipline
of persons admitted to practice law.

UTAH CODE, 1953, as amended:
Section 76-3-207(2).
(2) In these sentencing proceedings, evidence may be
presented as to any matter the court deems relevant to the
sentence, including but not limited to nature and circumstances
of the crime, the defendant's character, background, history,
mental and physical condition, and any other fact in aggravation
or mitigation of the penalty. Any evidence the court deems to
have probative force may be received regardless of its
admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence. The
state's attorney and the defendant shall be permitted to present
argument for or against sentence of death. Aggravating
circumstances shall include those as outlined in 76-5-202.
Mitigating circumstances shall include the following:
(a) - (g) [omitted]

Utah Code, 1953, as amended (continued):
Section 76-5-201.
(1) A person commits criminal homicide if he intentionally,
knowingly, recklessly, with criminal negligence or acting with a
mental state otherwise specified in the statute defining the
offense, causes the death of another human being, including an
unborn child. There shall be no cause of action for criminal
homicide against a mother or a physician for the death of an
unborn child caused by an abortion where the abortion was
permitted by law and the required consent was lawfully given.
(2) Criminal homicide is murder in the first and second
degree, manslaughter, negligent homicide, or automobile homicide.

Section 76-5-202 (l)(q).
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the first degree
if the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of
another under any of the following circumstances:
(q)

The homicide was committed in an especially heinous,

atrocious, cruel, or exceptionally depraved manner, any of which
must be demonstrated by physical torture, serious physical abuse,
or serious bodily injury of the victim before deach.

Utah Code, 1953, as amended (continued):
Section 78-2-4(1).
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and
evidence for use of the courts of the state and shall by rule
manage the appellate process. The legislature may amend the rules
of procedure and evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a
vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the
Legislature.
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APPELLANT'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF
STATEMENT
1

On March 8, 1988, pursuant to the pro-se Motion of

2

Defendant, Defendant's appointed appellate counsel was discharged

3

and this counsel was appointed to brief the Court on the nine

4

issues raised by Defendant in his pro-se Motion for Reversal of

5

Appellant's December 18th, 1985, Conviction and orally argue the

6

same nine issues.

7

Accordingly, this brief argues those nine issues, albeit in

8

a somewhat rearranged, consolidated,

and re-numbered order,

9

omitting certain of Defendant's citations considered by this

10

counsel not to be relevant and with additional points and

11

authorities considered by this counsel to be

12

particular argument. The rearrangement, editing, omissions and
1

pertinent to the

1

additions of this brief are not meant to denigrate or abandon any

2

of Defendant's pro-se arguments; if it is determined by any

3

Justice that any of the points of this brief differs

4

significantly from the arguments for any of the issues raised by

5

Defendant, himself, deference should be given to Defendant's own

6

arguments, as this counsel considers this appointment to be for

7

the purpose clarifying and providing proper legal support for

8

Defendant's own arguments and not for the purpose of supplanting

9

them.

.0

Neither is it the.intent of this brief to contest the

.1 arguments previously argued by Defendant's former appointed
2

appellate counsel or by Amicus, except as may be specifically set

3

forth herein.

4

STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED IN THIS BRIEF

5

1. Was Defendant prejudiced by duplicitous charges contained

6
7

in the Information?
2. Should the alleged confession of Defendant have been

3

suppressed for the reason that it was not a verbatim

)

transcription of his own words, but rather was drafted and

) dictated by an investigating officer.

2

1

3. Was Defendant prejudiced by the trial court's allowance

2

of an investigating and testifying officer to assist the

3

prosecution at counsel table throughout the course of the trial?

4
5
6
7
8
9

4. Is Defendant prejudiced from effectively appealing for
the reason that no record was made of the peremptory challenges?
5. Should Defendant's conviction be reversed because of
certain prosecutorial misconduct?
6. Was Defendant denied effective assistance of counsel for
reasons in addition to those raised in the first Supplemental

10

Brief and in the Amicus Curiae Brief and should Defendant's

11

conviction and/or sentence of death be vacated and the matter

12

remanded for new trial and or penalty phase?

13

7. Does the cumulative effect of the various errors

14

committed by the trial court, omissions of his defense counsel,

15

and prosecutorial misconduct demand that Defendant's conviction

16

and/or sentence of death be vacated and the matter remanded for

17

new trial and/or penalty phase?

18
19

FACTS
Defendant was charged by Information dated 12 April, 1985,

20

charging him with a violation of Sections 76-5-201 and 76-5-202,

21

Utah Criminal Code, as amended (R. 26). Defendant made an initial

22

appearance before the Honorable G. Gordon Knudsen, Judge, Eighth
3

1

Circuit Court, on the 14th of June, 1985, at which hearing it was

2

noted that Duke McNeil of Chicago had been retained as

3

Defendant's attorney

4

on 25 June, 1985, with Mr. McNeil appearing for Defendant. The

5

record indicates that on 29 November, 1985, counsel for Defendant

6

filed a Motion to Suppress Statements (R. 41) and a Notice of

7

Insanity Defense or in the Alternative Defense of Diminished

8

Mental Capacity

9

5 1 ) . It does not appear from the record that counsel for the

L0

Defendant filed other motions or requested discovery from the

LI

prosecution.

.2

(R. 4 - 5 ) . Preliminary examination was held

(R. 50) and a Motion for Change of Venue

(R.

A hearing to set the trial date was held on the date of the

.3

filing of the Notice of Insanity Defense, on 29 November, 1985

.4

(R. 5 5 ) . Defendant did not appear at such hearing. A further

5

hearing on all pre-trial motions was conducted on 9 December,

6

1985, Defendant appeared personally at such subsequent hearing

7

where testimony was introduced and argument made regarding the

8

motions for suppression and change of venue (R. 239 - 4 0 1 ) .

9

However, only one brief exchange was had between counsel and the

0

court regarding the alienist's reports, and no specific reference

1

was made to the insanity defense

2

his counsel did not consult with him or give him prior notice of

(R. 3 9 8 ) . Defendant asserts that

4

1

the insanity defense notice and that he would not have consented

2

to such defense because he wished to pursue the defense that he

3

was not guilty because he did not do the acts alleged in the

4

Information, not that he did the acts but was insane or of

5

diminished mental capacity. Defendant further asserts that he was

6

not informed of or prepared for the examinations conducted by

7

the two court-appointed alienists at the Utah County Jail. The

8

insanity defense notice was later withdrawn on 11 December, 1985,

9

pursuant to Defendant's motion (R 64 - 65).

10

Trial of the matter was eventually commenced on 12 December,

11

1985. The Information was read to the jury verbatim by the trial

12

court (R. 1046). Prior to opening statements, counsel for

13

Defendant moved for exclusion of all witnesses (R. 1035).

14

Despite the court's favorable ruling on such motion and without

15

objection from Defendant's counsel or designation or proffer of

16

proof that he was essential to the presentation of the State's

17

case, Lieutenant George Pierpont of the Provo City Police

18

Department was allowed to remain in the courtroom and assist the

19

prosecutor throughout the trial (R. 1041).

20
21

Lieutenant Pierpont was called as the State's fourth witness
on the fourth day of trial and testified that on 12 April, 1985,
5

1

in the jail located in the Metropolitan Safety Building of

2

Nashville Tennessee, Defendant, who had been arrested the

3

previous day by Nashville police officers, signed a document

4

entitled STATEMENT FORM (R. 2 1 9 ) . Lieutenant Pierpont further

5

testified that the document was signed after a brief interview of

6

Defendant conducted by officer Pierpont and another Provo City

7

Police Officer, Sergeant Stan E g a n , and that the substance of

8

such document was dictated by him (Pierpont) to a stenographer of

9

the Nashville Metropolitan Police Department after the interview

10

of Defendant and that Defendant reviewed and signed the document

11

in the officer's presence after it had been transcribed by the

12

stenographer (R. 1189 - 1 1 9 2 ) . In addition to the Motion to

13

Suppress and hearing thereon noted herein-above, objection to

14

introduction of the statement was made at trial by counsel for

15

Defendant (R. 1184 - 1 1 8 5 ) . Lieutenant Pierpont was later

16

recalled for further examination as the State's final witness (R.

17

1 3 3 6 ) . Officer Egan did not testify at trial.

L8

Counsel for Defendant requested and was granted

instructions

19

on the lesser included offenses of murder in the second degree

20

(R. 1 4 4 , 147 - 148) and manslaughter (R. 150 - 151) (also R. 154

11

and 1 7 7 ) . Defendant asserts that he was not consulted prior to

22

his counsel 's request for these lesser included instructions and
6

1

that had he been consulted he would not have approved such

2

requests, again for the reason that he did and does maintain that

3

he was not guilty because he did not commit the acts alleged in

4

the Information, not because he did the acts but may have been

5

guilty of one of the lesser included offenses. Defendant was

6

found guilty as charged of murder in the first degree (R. 220 -

7 222).

8
9

At the penalty stage of Defendant's trial his counsel
presented the reports of the two court-appointed alienists by

10

having the clerk read each into the record (R. 1411 - 1429). No

11

other evidence was offered to establish mitigating factors in

12

support of the argument for a sentence of life imprisonment. The

13

jury rendered a verdict of death (R. 223).

14

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

15

It was error for the trial court to read the Information to

16

the jury as the Information contained duplicate reference to the

17

same offense. Such duplication prejudiced the Defendant.

18

Defendant is prevented from effectively and completely

19

arguing on appeal as no record was kept of the peremptory

20

challenges exercised by the parties.
7

1

The trial court erred in allowing introduction of

2

Defendant's written "confession" as such writing memorialized the

3

statements of the investigating officer and not the statements

4

and words of Defendant, himself. This Court should rule that in

5

capital cases and cases of similar magnitude, purported

6

statements and confessions be verbatim transcriptions of the

7

questioning and responses, or if not verbatim, at least supported

8

by back-up stenographic or electronic recording of the

9

questioning and the declarant's actual statement.

10
11

In his closing argument at the guilt stage, the prosecution

12

made repeated improper reference to facts not admitted into

13

evidence, to Defendant's exercise of his right not to testify,

14

and vouched for a State's witnesses. Such misconduct was not

15

properly cured by contemporaneous instruction and allowed the

16

jury to deliberate on issues not properly before it, thus

L7

unfairly prejudicing Defendant.

L8

The trial court erred in allowing the chief investigating

L9

officer to remain at the State's prosecution table throughout the

10

entire course of the trial to assist the prosecutor as well as

11

testify, although his presence at counsel table was not shown to

12

be necessary to the State's presentation of its case and in fact
8

1

was not necessary. In capital cases and cases of like magnitude,

2

this court should rule that such procedure is improper as it

3

tends to suggest that the prestige of the State is behind such

4

witness.

5

Defendant's counsel's representation was below an objective

6

standard of competence generally, and specifically at the penalty

7

stage. Such demonstrable deficiencies prejudiced the outcome of

8

Defendant's trial and raises a reasonable doubt as to the

9

fairness of the jury's verdicts.

10
11

The cumulative effect of the

trial court's errors,

12

prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance of defence

13

counsel resulted in a denial of a fair opportunity for Defendant

14

to present his defenses and raises reasonable doubt that the

15

outcome of the guilt/innocence and/or penalty stage would have

16

been the same absent such errors and omissions.

17

This court should review the entire record of the

18

proceedings in this matter in order to determine if the finding

19

of guilt and the death penalty are appropriate, notwithstanding

20

Defense counsel 's failure object or take exception to the various

21

claimed errors at the trial level and notwithstanding the failure
9

1

of counsel to raise relevant issues either in this brief or

2

others filed on Defendant's behalf.

3

ARGUMENT

4

I

5

NUMEROUS CASES FROM THIS COURT PROVIDE THAT THE ENTIRE

6

RECORD OF CAPITAL CASES SHOULD BE REVIEWED AND ALL ERRORS

7

CONSIDERED - SUA SPONTE IF NECESSARY - IF IT APPEARS THAT THE

8

INTERESTS OF JUSTICE REQUIRE.

9

This brief will raise and argue several issues of claimed

10

error and prejudice, some of which have not been properly raised

11

at the trial level. Under normal standards of review, Defendant

12

would be prevented from raising such matters anew on appeal.

13

Nevertheless, this Court has, itself, declared that its duty in

14

capital cases extends to consideration of error even if not

15

raised below. See cases cited in point I of Amicus Curiae Brief

16

as well as State v Schoenfeld, 545 P2nd 193; State v Codianna,

17

573 P2nd 343; State v Shad, 470 P2nd 246.

18

Further, this Court has ruled that-

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

[w]hile we will not ordinarily raise questions of
error on our own motion, ...it is well established that
in capital cases when the interests of justice so
require the entire proceeding should be reviewed to
determine whether errors occurred as a consequence of
which the accused did not have a fair trial, even
though not assigned and argued. State v St. Clair, 282
P2nd 323.
10

1

Consequently, this Court should consider issues raised for

2

the first time in this brief or in the briefs previously filed

3

for Defendant. It should also review the entire record for issues

4

that may have not been briefed, as this Court will undoubtedly

5

note from the various briefs that justice requires such a

6

complete review, in light of the many points raised in the

7

various briefs, in light of the substantial doubt as to the legal

8

sufficiency of Defendant's trial counsel and in light of its

9

long standing ruling that-

10
11
12

[w]e reject the proposition that the death penalty
may be imposed when there is substantial doubt whether
it should be. State v Wood, 648 P2nd 71.

13

This position to consider plain error is consistent with

14

the position of other jurisdictions. See U.S. v Guzman, 781 F2nd

15

428; Phillips v Lane, 787 F2nd 208; Government of the Virgin

16

Islands v Joseph, 765 F2nd 394. In reviewing the briefs (and

17

hopefully, the entire record) this Court will discover several

18

instances of plain error that may or may not have been raised

19

below and that may or may not have been argued here. This Court

20

should, nevertheless, consider any and all errors that cast

21

substantial doubt on the "fairness, integrity or public

22

reputation of [the] judicial proceedings" conducted below,

11

1

Guzman, supra, to determine whether the verdicts of guilt and

2

death were properly reached.

3

II

4

IN THE STATE'S CITING TWO STATUTES IN THE INFORMATION AND

5

THE COURT'S READING THE INFORMATION TO THE JURY, DEFENDANT WAS

6

PREJUDICED IN THAT THE JURY WAS LEAD TO BELIEVE THAT DEFENDANT

7

WAS CHARGED WITH TWO SEPARATE OFFENSES.

8
9

The Information filed in this matter charged Defendant with
violations of Sections 76-5-201 and 76-5-202, Utah Criminal Code,

10

as amended (R. 26). The Information was read to the jury,

11

verbatim, by the trial judge, himself, prior to opening argument

12

(R. 1046). The charging and reading of the two separate statutes

13

implies the State's allegation that Defendant had committed two

14

unrelated offenses. This possible implication was compounded by

15

the court's instructions which made no reference to the meaning

16

or import of Section 76-5-201 to the matter at hand.

17

Instruction No. 6 applies the language of Section 76-5-202

18

to the alleged facts of the case (R. 141); but no reference was

19

made to che meaning or significance of Section 76-5-201 or why

20

two statutes were cited in the Information, probably because

21

Section 76-5-201 was not necessary to a complete presentation of
12

1

the facts or law relevant to the State's charges. The unnecessary

2

charging and reading of the reference to both statutes without an

3

explanatory instruction on why two were cited served no legal

4

purpose but left the jury with the possible impression that

5

another charge lingered against Defendant and created the

6

implication of more criminal activity than the State was entitled

7

to charge.

8
9

See United States v Marquardty 786 F2nd 771.

If it were in fact necessary for a complete charging of the
alleged offense that both statutes be included in the

10

Information, and if it were in fact necessary for the jury's

11

complete understanding of the charge that the court make

12

reference to both statutes, then it was also necessary that an

13

explanatory instruction be included to inform the jury of both

14

sections' significance to the charge. However, Instruction No. 6

15

sets forth a complete allegation of the charge and the facts

16

without need to draw on any of the language of Section 76-5-201.

17

Consequently, it appears that Section 76-5-201 was unnecessary to

18

the State's case or the jury's understanding of the charge and

19

that both should not have been cited and read to the jury.

20
21

There is a substantial likelihood that the unnecessary
reading of the two statutes, when one would have sufficed,
13

1

without further explanation or instruction, created more

2

questions than answers in the minds of the jury and prejudiced

3

Defendant by implying another unexplained and unarticulated

4

offense, creating the substantial likelihood that the jury's

5

guilt and sentence verdicts were rendered partially on the jury's

6

belief that Defendant was a "bad person".

7
8
9

III
DEFENDANT IS PREVENTED FROM FULLY PRESENTING ARGUMENTS ON

10

APPEAL FOR THE REASON THAT NO RECORD WAS MADE OF THE PARTIES'

11

EXERCISE OF THEIR PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES.

12

The parties commenced exercise of their respective

13

peremptory challenges on the morning of 16 December and

14

then halted before finishing their challenges in order to recess

15

to accommodate Defendant's counsel's need to retrieve certain

16

material expected to be flown in from his home office (R. 1026).

17

The court reconvened that afternoon at which time the remainder

18

of the parties' respective peremptory challenges were exercised

19

(R. 1033). The record only briefly indicates the above-noted

20

occurrences without further comment or memorialization.

21

Defendant asserts that the silence of the record in this

22

regard prevents him from discovering possible error in the

23

exercise of these privileges; this counsel has been unable to
14

1

find case law bearing on this issue with which to advise this

2

Court.

3
4

IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING A PURPORTED STATEMENT

5

FROM DEFENDANT AND THIS COURT SHOULD RULE THAT IN CAPITAL CASES

6

AND MATTERS OF SIMILAR MAGNITUDE, TO BE ADMISSIBLE, ALLEGED

7

CONFESSIONS SHOULD BE VERBATIM TRANSCRIPTIONS OF THE DECLARANT'S

8

OWN WORDS, MEMORIALIZED BY A STENOGRAPHICALLY OR ELECTRONICALLY

9

RECORDED RECORD OF THE DECLARANT'S SPOKEN STATEMENT OR BY AN

10
11

ALTERNATIVE METHOD OF EQUAL RELIABILITY.
A statement (R. 219, State's exhibit no. 26) attributed to

12

Defendant was admitted into evidence on foundation provided by

13

the testimony of Lieutenant George Pierpont of the Provo City

14

Police Department (R. 1193). Objection was taken to the admission

15

of the statement (R. 1184 - 1185 and 1193). The statement was

16

also the subject of a pre-trial Motion to Suppress Statements (R.

17

41) which was argued (R. 249 - 357) and

18

the trial court which found it was voluntarily given by Defendant

19

(R. 357).

denied prior to trial by

20

The procedure used to take and record the purported

21

statement was explained by Lieutenant Pierpont on direct
15

1

examination (R. 1189 - 1193) and again on cross examination (R.

2

1211 - 1216). The information contained in the writing was

3

dictated to a police secretary by officer Pierpont after he had

4

conducted a brief interview of Defendant in the presence of

5

officers Cunningham of the Nashville Metropolitan Police

6

Department and Egan of the Provo Police Department. The writing

7

was then presented to Defendant for his signature. The writing,

8

therefore, is actually a memorialization of officer Pierpont's

9

statement of the facts he claims were related to him by

10

Defendant; it comprises the words, phrases, and terminology of

11

officer Pierpont, not of Defendant. The State did not urge, and

12

it does not appear that the procedure used to record the

13

purported statement was necessary because of unusual or exigent

14

circumstances; rather the method used was one of convenience and

15

departmental policy.

16

As noted, defense counsel filed and argued a motion asking

17

for suppression of the statement for the reason that it was not

18

voluntarily given. It is not clear whether counsel also objected

19

to the statement's admission for the separate reason that the

20

method used to take the statement - in and of itself - was

21

prejudicial, although counsel did argue that it was improper and

22

bore on the issue of voluntariness. Nevertheless, it is urged
16

1

here that this Courtf pursuant to powers granted by the

2

Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, Section 4, and Section 78-2-

3

4(1) , Utah Code, promulgate a rule that in capital cases and

4

matters of similar magnitude, in addition to all other

5

foundational requirements, to be admissible, statements bearing

6

directly on the alleged offense taken by investigating officers,

7

purportedly made by an accused, in a custodial setting, be

8

preserved by stenographic or electronic recordings of the

9

verbatim spoken words of the declarant, or by another method

10

equally reliable in its ability to memorialize the accused's own

11

spoken or written words.

12

Such methods would more nearly preserve the actual nuances,

13

inflections, emotions, and emphasis of the declarant as well as

14

provide defense counsel, the court, and the jury with a more

15

accurate record of the methods used to extract the statement and

16

protect against undue influence and intimidation. A more accurate

17

record of the entire interrogation process is especially relevant

18

in a situation such as this where Defendant claims the statement

19

was involuntarily induced and where he chooses to exercise his

20

right not to testify and as a consequjnce the jury is left with

21

only a cold and technical impression of Defendant, personally,

22

and an uncaring and matter-of-fact account of events in the words
17

1

of the investigator, emphasizing what the investigator feels is

2

important to the development of the case, and essentially

3

omitting any of the humanity of the accused. Attributing the

4

words of another to the Defendant, himself, undermines his right

5

not to testify.

6

Neither would the safeguards unduly burden the police

7

responsibilities of the State. Such methods of preservation are

8

readily available in most, if not all, modern police facilities,

9

and if they are not, they would certainly be available from an

10

outside source such as a nearby court, without undue delay or

11

expense. And as this case illustrates, to do otherwise is more

12

often a choice of convenience rather than necessity.

13

Where the accused's life is in the balance, where modern

14

methods of preservation are readily available, where the burden

15

to the State is minimal, and where - as in this instance - an

16

accused's purported statement is undoubtedly the most pivotal

17

and focused-upon item of evidence, it would seem appropriate that

18

the jury be given the best evidence. At both the guilt and

19

penalty stages it is critical that the jury know and judge for

20

themselves whether there was remorse, tears, fears, concern for

21

the victim or family, pressure, intimidation, or promises. And,
18

1

of course, more accurate methods of preserving a statement would

2

better enable the court to make assessments of the voluntariness

3

of the statement and the completeness of the explanation and

4

understanding of rights.

5

It is recognized that such protections may not be

6

appropriate or necessary in every police interrogation, but in

7

capital cases where the consequences are severe and mitigating

8

circumstances are critical to the jury's determination of the

9

penalty, the court and jury as well as the Defendant are

10

entitled to the best evidence that is reasonably available. This

11

can be assured by such extraordinary procedures.

12

Whereas this Defendant was denied the best evidence of his

13

purported statement, whereas such denial was unfairly

14

capitalized upon in the prosecution's closing argument (as is

15

argued hereinbelow), and whereas no immediate cautionary

16

instructions to disregard such improper capitalization were given

17

by the court, this Court should reverse Defendant's conviction,

18

remand for new trial and rule the purported statement of

19

Defendant inadmissable.

19

1

V

2

IMPROPER STATEMENTS MADE BY THE PROSECUTION IN CLOSING

3

ARGUMENT UNDULY PREJUDICED DEFENDANT AND RAISE REASONABLE DOUBT

4

AS TO WHETHER THE JURY CONFINED ITS DELIBERATION TO LEGALLY

5

ADMITTED EVIDENCE.

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

This Court has ruled that[i]n reviewing a claim of prosecutorial
misconduct, we must determine if the prosecutor's
remarks calls to the attention of the jurors matters
they would not be justified in considering in reaching
the verdict and, if so, whether there is a reasonable
likelihood that the misconduct so prejudiced the jury
that there would have been a more favorable result
absent the misconduct. State v Speer, 750 P2nd 186,
citing State v Tillman, 750 P2nd 546; Also see State v
Fisher, 680 P2nd 35.

17
18

Defendant asserts that several improper prosecutorial

19

arguments were left uncured by the court with the result that the

20

jury was allowed to consider facts not properly before them

21

and/or which unfairly prejudiced their deliberations in favor of

22

the State. The improper statements were of three types:

23

misstatements of facts, comments on the Defendant's exercise of

24

his right to remain silent, and vouching for a State's witness.

25

Misstatements of facts.

26
27

As has been argued, Defendant challenged introduction of his
purported statement at the pre-trial and trial stages and this
20

1

brief has urged that this Court adopt a rule that would provide

2

for a more fair and accurate record of the circumstances and

3

substance of any purported statements from an accused in a

4

capital case. Interestingly, the need for a better record of the

5

taking and exact nature of the statement is best illustrated by

6

the prosecution's adroit, yet improper, references to the

7

statement in closing argument. Counsel pointed out that

8

defendant in his own statement, in his own confession, tells you

9

that 'After I stabbed her eight times 'in the back she was still

ff

[t]he

10

moaning and gasping.'" (R. 1344 - 1345). Later, the prosecutor

11

argued, "We know that because Ms. Oleson, according to his

12

[Defendant's] own mouth, dropped the knife in the kitchen after

13

he ordered her to do so

14

man who can commit those acts, can write them down for you in a

15

confession ... deserves to be found guilty...." (R. 1354).

16

Finally, in rebuttal, the prosecutor noted "[t]here is only one

17

person in this room who was an eye-witness to the murder of Eva

18

Oleson...[h]e has provided for you by his own mouth each and

19

every element of the crimes that are set forth in first degree

20

murder." (R. 1387).

" (R. 1349). Again, he argued "The

21

But, exhibit No. 26 was not the Defendant's "own

22

statement;" it was not "according to [Defendant's] own mouth;"
21

1

Defendant did not "write them down;" the words were not "provided

2

... by [Defendant's] own mouth." The statement was officer

3

Pierpont's; it was according to officer Pierpont's own mouth; and

4

the stenographer wrote them down as they were provided by officer

5

Pierpont's own mouth. It was improper for the prosecutor to argue

6

that the words of the statement were Defendant's when they

7

weren't; it was wrong to imply Defendant chose and mouthed the

8

actual word when he didn't, when the evidence that the words of

9

the writing were exclusively officer Pierpont's was

10

11

uncontroverted.

While at first glance, it might appear harmless to attribute

12

the words of the statement directly to Defendant, it must be

13

remembered that Defendant argued he had signed the document only

14

after improper inducement and that the substance of the

15

statement was untrue; whether the statement was voluntarily

16

signed and whether the statement was true were still contested

17

issues. To state that the words of the statement were Defendant's

18

own was to connote that those issues had been decided against

19

Defendant. It was, however, the jury's prerogative to decide

20

those issues.

22

1

Further, with all due respect to officer Pierpont, the

2

statement is comprised of classic police-report phraseology and

3

reads like a technical document. In a case where the jury is to

4

eventually determine, based on a consideration of the aggravating

5

and mitigating factors, whether the Defendant should be sentenced

6

to death, to attribute the dispassionate and remote tone of the

7

writing directly to Defendant is to subtly imply the existence

8

of an aggravating factor that is not factually founded in the

9

writing.

10

If it is civilly wrong to make unfair use of another's words

11

then it is certainly improper in this capital case to

12

inaccurately attribute the words of an investigating officer to

13

the Defendant. Such improper references suggested to the jury

14

that Defendant approved of the words and truthfulness of the

15

statement and additionally that Defendant, himself, mouthed the

16

words in the cold, hard fashion they appear in the writing.

17

If

18

liberty to strike foul ones." Berger v U.S., 295 US 78; U.S. v

19

Valdes-Guerra, 758 F2nd 1411.

20

prejudiced the jury at both the guilt and penalty stages and

21

require reversal of Defendant's conviction.

[W]hile [the prosecutor] may strike hard blows, he is not at

The misstatements of fact

23

1

Comments on failure to testify*

2
3

In his final w o r d s of r e b u t t a l , the prosecutor argued to the
jury-

4
5
6
7
8
9
LO

I heard no e v i d e n c e , e v i d e n c e , [sic] from the
w i t n e s s stand about coercion or about inducing somebody
to say anything about something that d i d n ' t h a p p e n . I
heard no evidence that supports any other theory in
this case than the theory that was presented by the
State of U t a h , that he is guilty of first d e g r e e
m u r d e r . (R. 1 3 8 6 ) .

LI

The Supreme Court of the United States has ruled that the

L2

F i f t h A m e n d m e n t of the United States C o n s t i t u t i o n by way of the

L3

F o u r t e e n t h A m e n d m e n t forbids the p r o s e c u t i o n ' s commenting on a

L4

d e f e n d a n t ' s choice to exercise his right not to t e s t i f y , Griffin

L5

v C a l i f o r n i a , 380 US 6 0 9 ; and that although such a comment can be

.6

considered harmless e r r o r , the burden is on the p r o s e c u t i o n to

L7

e s t a b l i s h beyond a reasonable doubt that the comment was not

L8

prejudicial to the d e f e n d a n t , C h a p m a n v C a l i f o r n i a , 386 US 1 8 .

.9

Other federal d e c i s i o n s have ruled that references to the

10

exercise of the right to remain silent do not have to be explicit

21

but m u s t be judged by w h a t the jury probably t h o u g h t , U . S . v

>2

H a n d m a n , 447 F2nd 8 5 3 .

13
!4

Some jurisdictions have expanded the federal p r o t e c t i o n that
forbids

comment on a d e f e n d a n t ' s exercise of the right by ruling
24

1

that any comment is prejudicial per-se, requiring automatic

2

reversal. See U.S.v Flannery, 451 F2nd 880 (1st Cir.); State v

3

Smith, 420 P2nd 278 (Az.); Flaherty v State, 183 So2nd 607

4

(Fla.); State v Wright, 205 So2nd 324 (La.); Sanders v State, 392

5

SW2nd 916 (Tenn.); People v Alexander, 169 NW2nd 652 (Mich.);

6

State v Chunn, 657 SW2nd 292 (Mo.). While others subscribe to the

7

federal rule that the court must place the burden on the

8

prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v Davis, 212

9

A2nd 19 (N.J.); Commonwealth v Reichard, 233 A2nd 603 (Pa.);

10

State v Martin, 498 P2nd 1370 (N.M.); State v Gladue, 677 P2nd

11

1228 (Mont.). Several states consider the right to remain silent

12

so fundamental that a violation of the right will be reviewed on

13

appeal even absent a proper objection at trial. See State v

14

Smith, supra (Az.); State v Chasse, 230 A2nd 51 (Conn.);

15

Singleton v State, 183 So2nd 245 (Fla).

16

This Court has ruled that any reasonable doubt as to

17

prejudice that may have occurred by reason of a comment on the

18

failure of the defendant to testify must be resolved in favor of

19

the defendant, State v Eaton, 569 P2nd 1114. Counsel's comment

20

can fairly be interpreted as being in reference to the

21

Defendant's choice not to testify and gives rise to reasonable

22

doubt that the jury was thereby prejudiced.
25

1

Although the prosecutor did not specifically refer to

2

Defendant in his comments, it is clear that only one person could

3

have provided the evidence that was pointed out as missing. Since

4

Defendant was alone during the entire interrogation process in

5

Nashville he was the only possible witness who was in a position

6

to give evidence "about coercion or about inducing somebody to

7

say anything about something that didn't happen," Similarly,

8

since the main issue at the trial was not that a murd€>r didn't

9

occur or that there were jurisdictional or limitation

10

restrictions, etc, but simply whether or not Defendant was the

11

offender, counsel's comment that he had "heard no other theory in

12

this case than the theory that was presented by the State of

13

Utah," can also be fairly interpreted as a reference to

14

Defendant's failure to take the stand to deny the accusations or

15

to offer his alibi. These comments go beyond a statement on the

L6

paucity of the defence, generally, and can only logically be

L7

considered as

L8

himself, to testify.

veiled comments on the failure of the Defendant,

.9

When viewed in light of the lack of any objection and the

!0

lack of a contemporaneous admonition by the court to disregard

!l

the comments, there is reasonable doubt that some or most or all

2

of the members of the jury understood that they were obliged not
26

1

to draw any adverse conclusion from Defendant's decision not to

2

testify. Since Defendant has established prime facia evidence of

3

an improper comment on his choice not to testify, this Court

4

should consider the argument that this fundamental right was

5

violated by the comments, notwithstanding defense counsel's

6

failure to object and should resolve the reasonable doubt that

7

Defendant was thereby prejudiced in favor of Defendant.

8

Vouching.

9

The prosecutor further commented regarding a State's witness
fl

10

that

11

impressive witnesses in this particular case. She told you in all

12

honesty everything that she saw." (R. 1353). It is generally held

13

that it is improper for a prosecutor to express a personal belief

14

in the credibility of a witness People v Smith, 685 P2nd 786;

15

U.S. v Dennis, 786 F2nd 1029; or to otherwise vouch for a witness

16

and place the integrity and prestige of the government behind the

17

witness

18

925.

19

[y]ou know, Lucia Tovar to me was one of the most

State v Sargent, 698 P2nd 598; State v Salcido, 681 P2nd

Admittedly, this reference is isolated and was not repeated

20

or unduly emphasized by the prosecutor. Nevertheless, it was

21

clearly an improper statement of his personal belief in the
27

1

credibility of M r s . Tovar. And, when coupled with the previously

2

noted instances of improper comments on the part of the

3

prosecutor, which were also unchallenged and unadmonished, one is

4

left with

5

against Defendant and that the outcome of their deliberations

6

would not have produced a result more favorable to Defendant, but

7

for such improper comments.

reasonable doubt that the jury was without prejudice

8
9

VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE STATE'S CHIEF

10

INVESTIGATIVE OFFICER TO REMAIN AT COUNSEL TABLE THROUGHOUT THE

11

TRIAL AND TO TESTIFY FOR THE PROSECUTION.

12

Lieutenant George Pierpont of the Provo City Police

L3

Department led the investigation of the crime charged in this

L4

case. After Defendant's arrest in Nashville, Tennessee, h e , along

.5

with Provo City Sergeant Stan Egan, flew to Nashville, where

.6

they interviewed Defendant

.7

Pierpont dictated Defendant's purported statement to a Nashville

8

police secretary for typing.

(1190). Thereafter, Lieutenant

9
0

At trial, defense counsel requested and was granted

1

exclusion of witnesses, pursuant to Rule 615 of Utah Rules of

2

Evidence

(R. 1035). However, without any showing of need,

28

1

Lieutenant Pierpont was allowed to remain at the prosecution

2

table as part of a 3-man prosecution team including the chief

3

prosecutor and his assistantf Beverly Ramsey (R. 1041). Officer

4

Pierpont eventually testified, first as the State's fourth

5

witness (R. 1180) and later was recalled as the State's final

6

witness (R. 1336) .

.7
8
9

It is recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule
is generally considered to be to insure independence of

10

recollection and that investigative officers have been considered

11

to be "an officer or employee of a party which is not a natural

12

person designated as its representative by its attorney" thus

13

fitting into the exception set forth in

14

Maestas, 523 F2nd 316; U.S. v Pellegrino, 470 F2nd 1205; State v

15

McGrath, 749 P2nd 631. It is also recognized that officer

16

Pierpont's testimony probably was not susceptible to influence

17

from other witnesses in as much as it was confined to facts

18

concerning the taking of the purported statement from Defendant

19

and to the search for the suspected murder weapon, neither of

20

which was the subject of any other witnesses' testimony.

21
22

Rule 615(2), U.S. v

However, this Court is urged to consider the prejudicial
effect of the officer's continued presence at counsel table for
29

1

another reason. As was noted hereinabove in argument No. V, the

2

State is not permitted to place the prestige and integrity of the

3

government behind its witness, State v Sargent, supra; State v

4

Salcidof supra.

5

directly vouches for a witness as was done in the instance of

6

Mrs. Tovar. But, it also occurred more subtly with regard to

7

Officer Pierpont. In twice rising from counsel table to take the

8

stand, he testified as one of the prosecution team - almost as if

9

the prosecutor, himself, were giving testimony.

10

Obviously, this occurs when the prosecutor

This may be a necessary, proper, and acceptable procedure in

11

the day-to-day prosecutions that regularly take place in every

12

Circuit and District Court. It would not be reasonable to prevent

13

the arresting officer in the vast majority of cases from

L4

assisting counsel at the table, especially where counsel may have

L5

the responsibility for the prosecution of several cases, may

.6

have had limited opportunity to familiarize himself with the

.7

case, and would be unreasonably hampered without the assistance

8

of the officer.

9

But here, where the case involves a capital offense, where

0

trial was held some seven months after the preliminary

1

examination, where the lead prosecutor had the assistance of co30

1

counsel, where other officers were also available to testify as

2

to the substance of officer Pierpont's testimony (Officers

3

Cunningham and Egan) or alternatively to take Officer Pierpont's

4

place at counsel table, and where the credibility of Officer

5

Pierpont was critical to the issue of the reliability of the

6

purported confession, the lack of any real need for the officer's

7

assistance at counsel table did not justify the resulting

8

likelihood that the jury would be unnecessarily influenced by his

9

continued presence alongside the State's attorneys.

10

In trials of capital cases the court should be dogged in its

11

protection of the accused's rights to a fair and impartial jury

12

in order to assure "that the death penalty may not be imposed

13

where there is substantial doubt whether it should be." State v

14

Wood, supra. There is substantial doubt that Defendant's trial

15

was fundamentally fair and that the jury maintained its

16

impartiality where the State's principal witness who was twice

17

called to the witness stand, was for five days of trial allowed

18

to sit side by side with the State's counsel especially where

19

reasonable alternatives were available to the State.

31

1

VII

2

DEFENDANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR

3

REASONS IN ADDITION TO THOSE ARGUED IN THE FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL

4

BRIEF AND IN THE AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF.

5

This Court has ruled that to sustain a claim of ineffective

6

assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish

l)a

7

demonstrably deficient performance outside the wide rcinge of

8

professionally acceptable representation f and 2)the reasonable

9

probability that a different result would have obtained absent

10

such deficient assistance f State v Frame, 723 P2nd 401; State v

11

Archuleta, 747 P2nd 1019. This Court has further held that trial

12

tactics such as choice of witnesses or choice of lines of

13

questioning are matters usually entrusted to an attorney's best

14

judgment and as such are not "outside the wide range of

L5

professionally competent assistance." State v Speer f

L6

State v Frame, supra.

supra citing

.7
8

Amicus curiae has previously argued that defense counsel

9

was demonstrably ineffective in his apparent failure to

0

adequately acquaint himself with the facts relevant to the case

1

and with certain local law, as can be demonstrated, inter alia,

2

by his failure to request instructions for, examine the expert

3

witness about, or argue the application of the language of

32

1

Section 76-5-202(q) which statutorily qualifies the terms

2

"especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or exceptionally depraved

3

manner," which omissions had an adverse impact on both the guilt

4

and penalty phases. (As noted by amicus, the interchange between

5

the court and counsel that appears on pages 1300 through 1304 of

6

the record is particularly indicative of defense counsel 's

7

failure to acquaint himself with documents filed some eight

8

months prior to trial, specifically, and of his over-all failure

9

to prepare, generally.) This brief supports totally the

10

arguments of amicus curiae as regards this issue and wishes to

11

emphasize that the inadequacies noted in that brief are not

12

matters involving tactical decisions but products of an obviously

13

apparent failure to prepare.

14

In the Supplemental Brief submitted by appointed counsel it

15

is argued that trial counsel 's representation was below

16

acceptable objective standards of professional competence in that

17

defense counsel failed to fully and adequately pursue the

18

insanity defense. It should be noted that the Supplemental Brief

19

also points to failure to prepare as the root of the ineffective

20

assistance as regards the insanity motion. That brief correctly

21

argued that "[a] defense attorney should not be allowed to

22

automatically hide his failure to investigate, advise and prepare
33

1

a viable defense by simply raising the shield of trial tactic or

2

strategy."

3

It should also be noted that although the Supplemental Brief

4

argues that the insanity defense should have been pursued more

5

fully, in contrast, Defendant wishes to emphasize that he did not

6

authorize either the insanity defense or the request for the

7

lesser included instructions. He asserts that he had instructed

8

his counsel to argue to the jury that he was not guilty because

9

he did not do the act, not because he was insane or because he

10

did the act but was guilty of some lesser offense. He feels the

11

twp alternative arguments undermined the primary argument that

12

should have been emphasized, solely.

L3
L4
L5
.6
.7
.8

...an attorney acts as an assistant for his client
and not as a master. An attorney who refuses to present
such a basic claim as that of innocence acts outside
the duties of an attorney, even if the claim detracts
from other defenses presented by counsel. State v Wood,
supra.

9

This brief supports the assessments of both the Amicus

0

Curiae Brief and the Supplemental Brief that the record shows

1

evidence that defense counsel was demonstrably unprepared for a

2

trial of the significance of this case. Further, there appears to

3

be a real probability of a more favorable result had trial

1

counsel been more adequately prepared.
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1

While trial counsel's unpreparedness affected every stage of

2

the proceedings, it was especially damaging to the defense at the

3

penalty stage. The only evidence presented at the penalty stage

4

on behalf of Defendant was the written reports of the two

5

alienists appointed by the court to evaluate Defendant pursuant

6

the Notice of Insanity Defense. One alienist had interviewed

7

Defendant on one occasion; the other visited with Defendant

8

twice. The reports were read into the record by the clerk of the

9

court (R. 1411 - 1429) who apparently stumbled on several of the

10

words in the reports. It does not appear the alienists,

11

themselves,,were requested or subpoenaed to appear although each

12

was available: they were introduced to the prospective jurors on

13

the first day of trial by the prosecutor as possible prosecution

14

witnesses (R. 458) and they were later identified as possible

15

prosecution witnesses after defense counsel asked for invocation

16

of the exclusionary rule (R. 1036).

17

This procedure used to present defense evidence at the

18

penalty stage employed the court's clerk as the mouthpiece and

19

consisted of written reports from two alienists who had twice

20

before been presented to the jury as witnesses for the

21

prosecution. The alienists, themselves, were not present to be

22

examined or to explain or more fully develop their findings and
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1

conclusions or to accentuate the evidence within the reports that

2

might have benefitted Defendant or to counter the obvious

3

impression that the reports were written by witnesses aligned

4

with the State. No family members appeared, to make a showing of

5

support, although Defendant's mother, brother, ex-wife, and young

6

son were available and presumably willing to appear. No friends,

7

former employers, or others having significant association with

8

Defendant appeared. In fact no witnesses were called on

9

Defendant's behalf. The record leaves this counsel (and arguably

10

the jury) with the false impression that no person was willing to

11

appear and stand beside Defendant and that it was therefore

12

necessary to use State employees and witnesses to try to put on

L3

evidence of mitigating factors. No evidence of possible influence

L4

of alcohol was introduced despite testimony at the trial stage

.5

that indicated that possibility

6

competent preparation each of these problems could have been

7

avoided.

8

(R. 1 1 7 5 ) . With reasonably

In addition to the fact that trial counsel failed to

9

fully investigate and prepare minimally sufficient and reasonably

0

available evidence of mitigating factors at the penalty phase,

L

counsel further failed to protect and preserve certain of

1

Defendant's constitutionally protected rights in introducing the
36

1

evidence that was used. The alienists' reports were as damaging

2

for what they did contain as for what they didn't. Because

3

counsel failed to inform or prepare Defendant for the alienists'

4

interviews, Defendant made statements - and counsel later

5

introduced those statements - that might have been protected by

6

the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The reports

7

detail prior heroin and LSD use, prior commission of felonies,

8

imprisonment, a broken marriage, a period spent as a fugitive,

9

his response that "don't remember nothing about it" when asked

10

about the alleged crime, and one alienist's assessment that

11

ff

12

crime throughout the examination, he persistently denies any

13

recollection of the crime for which he is charged." The use of

14

the reports also allowed for violations of Defendant's 6th

15

Amendment rights to confrontation - both in that heresay from the

16

alienists, themselves was introduced and because damaging heresay

17

within heresay was included in the alienists' reporting of their

18

interviews with third parties, i.e. a jailer's impression that

19

Defendant was "cocky, arrogant, and manipulative."

20

[a]lthough he did not specifically deny having committed the

Although Section 76-3-207(2) allows for introduction of any

21

relevant evidence at the penalty stage "regardless of its

22

admissability under the exclusionary rules of evidence,"
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this

1

statute does not obviate Defendant's constitutional rights and

2

it seems unusual that defense counsel would allow introduction

3

of the reports when much of their contents served to accentuate

4

aggravating rather than mitigating factors. Note that the

5

prosecutor was quick to seize upon the reports in his closing

6

argument to point out the aggravating factors that appear in

7

them (R. 1433-1434). The only reason to which this counsel can

8

point to explain defense counsel 's use of the reports and his

9

failure to introduce any other evidence is his failure to

10

prepare. While it may be argued that this procedure was an

11

acceptable trial tactic within the wide range of competent

12

professional assistance, it appears probable to this counsel and

13

consistent with the other evidence of unpreparedness that the

L4

reports were relied on exclusively at the penalty stage

15 principally because trial counsel had not marshalled or prepared
.6 other available and potentially more effective evidence. One
7

wonders what might have been presented as evidence of mitigating

8

factors had there been no reports from the alienists.

9

In reviewing the trial transcript it is apparent that

0

defense counsel had significant tr^al skills but that he was

1

demonstrably unprepared on the facts and law. It appears his

I

primary trial "tactic11 was to rely on those trial skills at the
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1

expense of proper preparation. That tactic prejudiced defendant's

2

rights to a fair trial and to competent legal representation.

3

This Court should find trial counsel 's "tactic" not to be within

4

professionally acceptable limits and that such ineffective

5

assistance probably prevented a more favorable outcome at the

6

penalty stage.

7
8
9

VIII
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE ERRORS OF THE TRIAL COURT, THE
MISCONDUCT OF THE PROSECUTOR, AND THE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF

10

DEFENSE COUNSEL DENIED DEFENDANT A FAIR OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT

11

HIS DEFENCE.

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

... the Defendant is ... entitled to
have [the errors] considered cumulatively and
as a part of the over-all picture in
determining whether he had a fair opportunity
to present his defense. State v St.Clair,
supra; also see Gooden v Oklahoma, 617 P2nd
248.
As has been noted, the trial court committed several

20

errors, each of which, standing on its own, substantially

21

affected Defendant's ability to present a viable defense; the

22

prosecutor made several improper comments in closing argument,

23

each of which raise reasonable doubt as to whether the jury was

24

able to maintain its neutrality and impartiality; and, probably

25

most critical, the record indicates that defense counsel failed
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1

to adequately prepare for trial and was therefore unable to

2

protect Defendant's substantial rights at several junctures of

3

the trial.

4

A listing of those errors and omissions includes: the trial

5

court's denial of the motion for change of venue, its admission

6

of prejudicial and inflammatory photographs, its admission of

7

Defendant's purported statement where substantial evidence

8

existed indicating that it was not voluntarily given and where it

9

was not in the words of Defendant, its instruction allowing the

10

jury to consider any evidence presented at the guilt stage in its

11

deliberation in the penalty stage, its failure to instruct the

12

jury at both the guilt and penalty stage regarding the limiting

13

language of Section 76-5-202(q), its failure to exclude officer

L4

Pierpont from the proceedings, and its failure to give

15

contemporaneous admonishments to the jury to disregard the

.6 prosecutor's various improper comments during closing argument;
7

the prosecutor's improper comments during closing argument

8

including misleading references as to the meaning of aggravating

9

circumstances, a comment on Defendant's failure to testify,

0

vouching for a State's witness, and several misstatement of

1

facts; defense counsel's failure to discover, failure to avail

2

himself of the prosecutor's "open file" policy, failure to
40

1

educate himself as to local law, failure to adequately support

2

the motions for change of venue and the defense of insanity, and

3

failure to adequately present minimal evidence of mitigating

4

factors at the penalty stage.

5

In addition to the individual effect of each of the various

6

errors and omissions, their cumulative effect prejudiced

7

Defendant's right to a fundamentally fair trial by an impartial

8

jury.
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1

CONCLUSIONS

2

Defendant's conviction should be vacated and the matter

3

remanded for new trial for the reasons that the various errors of

4

the trial court, improper comments of the prosecutor, and most

5

notably, the failure of defense counsel to prepare an adequate

6

defense or object to the court's errors or the prosecutor's

7

misconduct undermine a reasonable confidence in the fundamental

8

fairness of the trail at both the guilt/innocence and sentence

9

stages.

10

11

Dated this 6th day of May, 1988.

Respectfully submitted by:

L2
13
L4
.5

Thomas H. Me&ns
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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